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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE M. MECHAM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GAIL T. MECHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 14084 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action where Plaintiff and Respon-
dant (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff) alleged mental 
distress and physical anguish and asked for custody of the 
minor child, no award of alimony for defendant, division 
of the property, among other things. Defendant and Appel-
lant (hereinafter referred to as Defendant) filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty 
and physical anguish and asked for custody of the minor 
child, reasonable and adequate child support and reasonable 
and adequate alimony, among other things. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court below granted Plaintiff and Defendant a 
divorce on grounds of mental cruelty• The Court awarded 
custody of the minor child to Plaintiff, retaining juris-
diction for a period of one year, subject to very liberal 
visitation rights. 
Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to 
Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P. and, in the Alternative, Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Alter 
and Amend Judgment pursuant to Rules 52 (b) and 59 (c) 
U.R.C.P., said motions being denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the award of care, cus-
tody and control of the minor child. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint was filed by the Plaintiff, George M. 
Mecham, on May 28, 1974. A Notice of Taking Deposition 
was set for June 6, 1974 of the Plaintiff. On June 4, 1974, 
a Stipulation was entered into by the parties providing for 
each party to be awarded a divorce on finding of grounds, 
temporary custody of the minor child in the Defendant for 
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two months and permanent custody based on her performance 
during the interim period, and, also, provision for conduct 
of the parties, child support and alimony, tempo.rary_pro-
perty distribution and permanent property distribution, 
attorney's fees, and issues reserved for determination by 
the Court, namely: award of custody, child support and 
alimony. 
Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim on June 24, 
1974. A Preliminary Injunction was issued on July 19, 1974, 
restraining Plaintiff from harassing the Defendant until 
trial date. On October 21, 1974, an Order was issued keeping 
the parties from having anyone of the opposite sex, the party 
may be dating, present with the minor child. On August 11, 
1974, Defendant's Petition for Appointment of Independant 
Counsel for Minor Child was heard and denied. On November 
25, 1974, Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance and Motion for 
Pre-Trial Hearing was heard and denied. 
Trial was held on November 29, 1974, December 2, 3, and 
4, 1974, and March 14, 1975. 
The evidence adduced at trial was as follows: 
Plaintiff attended George Washington University Law 
School and was admitted to the Utah State Bar on May 1967. 
(Tr. 130) He was previously married August 1963 (Tr. 168) 
but divorced on October 23, 1970. (Tr. 167, 200) He met 
Defendant, who was then a stewardess for Western Airlines 
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(Tr. 9) in September 1968 and started dating her, (Tr. 222) 
During the courtship, there were frequent representations by 
Plaintiff to Defendant regarding his marital status, (Tr, 169, 
170) even to the extent of Defendant being shown by Plaintiff 
documents purporting to be divorce papers. (Tr. 170, 223-226) 
Also, there appeared to be excessive drinking (defined as 
"three times a week to the point where you are staggering 
drunk"), proffer of an engagement ring and continual misrepre-
sentations by Plaintiff to Defendant (Tr. 12, 223-227) the 
culmination of which was her attempted suicide by taking an 
overdose of aspirins. (Tr. 11, 12, 141, 170, 227) 
The parties were finally married on November 7, 1970. 
(Tr. 10, 222,227) 
The minor child , Andrew, was born April 26, 1971. (Tr. 
227) Three months after his birth, Defendant was suffering 
severe depression caused by the death of her grandmother and 
Plaintifffs being out, drinking and lying during her preg-
nancy and she saw Dr. Peter Nielson, a Psychiatrist. (Tr. 
19, 20, 125, 170, 227, 235, 237, 268) 
After their marriage, the parties moved into an apart-
ment (Tr. 280) where they resided until October 1971 (Tr. 
228) or November 1972 (Tr. 281-282) when they moved into 
their home at 1459 Yale Avenue in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 281-
282) They resided there as a family until May 24, 1974. 
(Tr. 164) At the time of the trial, Plaintiff was thirty-
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five (35) years old (Tr. 129) and Defendant was twenty-nine 
(29) years old (Tr. 5), and employed in listing conversion 
with Mountain Bell. (Tr. 10) 
The marriage has been described as "tumultuous". (Tr. 
11, 133, L66, 167, 234, 235, 267) From the beginning of 
the courtship and during the course of the marriage, Plain-
tiff lied, (Tr. 12, 125, 167, 170, 223-226, 228-230, 232) 
drank excessively, (Tr. 12, 125, 223-228, 232-235, 238, 240, 
268, 269) was involved with other women (Tr. 230-232, 309) 
and had extra-marital affairs (Tr. 259, 306, 308, 310, 315-
316). He stayed out late at night and came home drunk, (Tr. 
125, 133, 228-233, 235,238) abused Defendant, (Tr. 234-236) 
used foul and abusive language in her presence (Tr. 174) 
and in the presence of the minor child (Tr. 251), came home 
drunk in the presence of the minor child, (Tr. 175, 232-233, 
236) threatened to put a knife in Defendant's stomach, (Tr. 
235-236) demeaned her, among other things, by saying "I hate 
you" in the presence of his parents (Tr. 231) and "get in 
the bedroom and spread your legs". (Tr. 237) 
Defendant, admittedly, is not totally without fault. 
When provoked because of his conduct, lying, drinking, staying 
out late, (Tr. 305) she has physically assaulted him, (Tr. 
22, 268), used foul language (Tr. 179) but not in-the pre-
sence of the minor child (Tr. 270) and locked Plaintiff out 
of the home. (Tr. 13-14, 178) She has been under the 
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influence of intoxicating beverages, but mainly at social 
functions together with Plaintiff. (Tr. 294-301) There is 
no evidence she has engaged in any immoral conduct in the 
presence of her child, or any conduct which was detrimental 
to the child. (Tr. 27-28, 31-34, 34-35, 38, 118-119) She 
has not denied her liason with another man starting in May, 
1974, the month the divorce complaint was filed, (Tr. 22-27, 
31, 39-41, 46) none of the conduct between them which can 
be shown to have been detrimental to the minor child. 
However, she always has shown herself to be a fit and 
proper mother during the course of the marriage. (Tr. 63) 
She is bright and intelligent, (Tr. 148) she learns fast, 
(Tr. 148, 159) she is well liked, (Tr. 160) she is hard 
working and industrious, (Tr. 149) and considerate of others. 
(Tr. 160) She is a good mother, (Tr. 29-30, 46-47, 152-154, 
260-261, 270, 313) who for the first three and one-half years 
(Tr. 11) of her child's life fed, clothed, trained, educated 
and nurtured him into a stable child. (Tr. 63, 71-73, 79, 
115, 120, 185) Witnesses from her employment, (Tr. 147-149, 
160-163) neighbor, (Tr. 187-194) personal friend before and 
after marriage, (Tr. 184-187) and mutual friend of Plaintiff 
and Defendant (Tr. 195-197) have all testified about Defen-
dant's qualities as a person, mother and friend. They have 
described the loving interaction between mother and child. 
(Tr. 28-29, 160-163, 184-197) She has fulfilled all of the 
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criteria set down by Plaintiff, Dr. C. Nielson, and Dr. 
Tedrow of a good parent. (Tr. 61-67, 71, 73-74, 89, 90, 
142, 145, 152-157, 160-163, 185-197) No evidence was in-
troduced showing that Defendant neglected the child, abused 
the child or, in her absence, left the child untended or 
in improper care. 
Then, there was the second suicide attempt on August 
6, 1974. (Tr. 12, 30, 125, 140) The continuing stimulus 
theory mentioned by Dr. Tedrow appears to apply here. (Tr. 
116, 172-174) She was going through a divorce, out of her 
home, (Tr. 14-16, 176, 242) without her child, without ade-
quate funds, without a job, harassed by Plaintiff and under 
the pressure of making some very heavy decisions. (Tr. 13-
14, 117, 134, 139, 164, 172-176, 242-244, 252, 256, 269) 
Finally, having her son state he did not want to stay with 
her (Tr. 126, 128, 139-140, 269) was the crushing blow. 
Andrew was present during this episode and this is the only 
instance where Defendant's conduct may have had a detrimen-
tal effect on him. (Tr. 140) 
In addition, Dr. Cantrell Nielson and Dr. Richard Ferre, 
psychiatrists, after interviewing the Plaintiff, Defendant 
and seeing the minor child and having knowledge of Defend-
ant's attempts at suicide, both felt the child should be 
placed with the mother, the Defendant. (Tr. 52, 59-60, 62-
63, 334, 336, EX 6-P) The psychiatrists have considered 
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her suicide attempts in their evaluation and have not deemed 
it serious enough to hinder her ability to be a mother to 
Andrew. (Tr. 52, EX 6-P) 
Plaintiff questions the clinical interview method used 
by Dr. C. Nielson, (Tr. 56-57) who was mutually agreed on 
by the parties. Yetf at the last moment, he secures the 
services of a psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Tedrow, who uses pre-
cisely the same clinical interview method, but without the 
benefit of seeing either the Defendant, the minor child or 
the paternal grandparents. (Tr. 93-95, 100) Likewise, the 
limitations of the personal interview method was mentioned, 
in questioning with Dr. C. Nielson. (Tr. 93-94) It is ob-
vious from the testimony of Dr. Tedrow that the information 
provided by Plaintiff was unilateral, limited, self-serving 
and biased, (Tr. 87, 105, 107) points Plaintiff made about 
Dr. C. Nielson1s interview. (Tr. 58) 
Dr. Tedrow did testify, however, that a person can be 
under stress and depression, a cause of suicide, if going 
through divorce, kicked out of the home, loss of the child, 
threatened with no money, and no place to live. (Tr. 13, 
100-102, 105, 113) He further stated there is question of 
stability of a person who drinks excessively, lies, uses 
foul and abusive language in the presence of his child. 
(Tr. 97-98) Finally, the Dr. testified that a mother who 
cares for a child for three years, as testified in this 
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case, (Tr. 110, 115) and the father is out of the picture, 
and there is sparse testimony of the father's contributions 
to the nurturing of the child, (Tr. 114, 142-143, 270) the 
mother would be the psychological parent; (Tr. Ill) this, 
inspite of his statements of the myth of the psychological 
parent. (Tr. 86, 92) Dr. C. Nielson also states the detri-
mental effect foul and abusive language, derogatory and 
demeaning language, intoxicated condition of one in the pre-
sence of the child, has. (Tr. 79) 
Also, it is important to observe the sequence of the 
psychiatrists. Dr. C. Nielson was seen during September 26, 
27, October 8, 19, 1974; (Tr. 50) Dr. Tedrow during November 
14, 20, 27, 1974; (Tr. 94) and Dr. Ferre during December and 
thereafter. (Tr. 324-325) Both before and after Dr. Tedrow, 
the psychiatrists have come up with the same recommendation. 
Dr. C. Nielson also found her relationship with Mr. Turpin 
not to be detrimental to her ability to care for her child. 
(Tr. 53, 84) 
Plaintiff produced only one witness besides himself, Dr. 
Tedrow. His testimony has already been commented on. Defen-
dant very charitably observed his virtues toward the child 
(Tr. 241) as did two other of Defendant's witnesses (Tr. 193, 
198), and one of the witnesses testified since Mr. Mecham's 
possession of Andrew, the child is more subdued. (Tr. 199) 
But, nowhere else has he shown any evidence that he is better 
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able to care for the child. He has, only in the abstract, 
testified what should be done, not what has been done. (Tr. 
142-145) In brief, there is little evidence brought out by 
Plaintiff that he can do as good or better job as a parent 
in raising Andrew, except for his own statement. (Tr. 114, 
142-143, 270) 
After the second suicide attempt, Defendant voluntarily 
gave possession of the child to Plaintiff on or about August 
7, 1974, to avoid conflict, inspite of her recollection she 
asked for the child back. (Tr. 256, 257) 
Plaintiff pursued the argument that because Defendant 
did not initiate legal action to secure custody of the child, 
she somehow displayed her lack of concern for the child. (Tr. 
31) Nothing could be further from the truth. The record 
will show efforts were made. More important, Defendant 
testified she did not persist because she did not desire to 
make a "football" out of the child. (Tr. 257) 
Plaintiff asserts a novel theory about one-to-one rela-
tionship regarding Defendant and her child; (Tr. 31, 42, 55, 75) 
he propounds the thesis that she is incapable of being with 
her son alone, but must be in the company of others and there-
fore has not sustained a one-to-one relationship. (Tr. 34-
42, 55, 75) Plaintiff fails to recognize defendant was with 
her child constantly. (Tr. 37, 160-163, 184, 187) It may be 
inferred the stability of the child at the present time is 
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because she saw to it he was able to play with other children 
on a peer group relationship and widen his horizons with 
people other than his parents and grandparents. (Tr. 51, 61, 
71, 73-74, 152, 155-156) Plaintiff on the other hand, has 
scant evidence of any relationship with the child whether 
it be one-to-one or otherwise except for his own statement. 
(Tr. 114, 142-143) 
There is testimony of Plaintiff's harassment of Defen-
dant while she had custody of the child, (Tr. 251-252, 257, 
331) but there is no testimony of Defendant's harassment of 
Plaintiff while he had the child. Was the fact the child 
was relatively free from symptoms normally caused by divorce 
(Tr. 51, 60, 71, 328-329) because Defendant nurtured and 
raised the child for the first three years and four months 
of his life and did not make a "football" out of him, (Tr. 
257) or because Plaintiff had the child for four months out 
of the childs life, particularly with no harassment from 
the Defendant? There is testimony the child is now more 
subduedf (Tr. 199) and may be experiencing increasing con-
fusion and insecurity. (Tr. 330) 
The paternal grandparents have made their presence 
felt both during the marriage (Tr. 164, 241) and after the 
separation. (Tr. 251-252, 257, 329) Both psychiatrists 
have considered their presence and yet, felt the child 
should be given to the Defendant. (Tr. 83-84, 328, 336) 
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The Court ruled it was going to leave custody as is 
subject to very liberal visitation. (Tr. 340) The Court 
then found in its conclusion that the grandparents were 
willing to assume the major responsibility for the minor 
child and the child was with the grandparents. (Tr. 340-
341) The Court further stated, "I don't want to twist the 
child up, that's my endeavor and problem." (Tr. 342) And, 
finally, the Court found both parents fit (Tr. 344), and 
then stated the custody would be split (Tr. 341) as it was 
before. 
The Decree of Divorce was entered and became final on 
the 28th day of March, 1975. Neither party appealed the 
divorce. Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant on 
the 17th day of April, 1975, on the award of custody to 
the Plaintiff. 
ISSUE 
The issue present on this appeal is whether the Lower 
Court erred in its ruling granting the care, custody and 
control of the minor child to the Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
As stated in the Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant in Cox v. 
Cox., Ut.2d, 532 P.2d 994(1975) No. 1324Z on pp. 12 and 13 relat-
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ing to the discretion of the trial court in divorce matters: 
In divorce cases the trial court has considerable 
discretion in determining what is equitable, and 
upon appeal, the decision of the court as to child 
custody will not be reversed unless it is clear 
that there was an abuse of discretion. Graziano v. 
Graziano, 7 Ut 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931,(1958); Sartain 
v. Sartain, 15 Ut 2d 198, 389 P.2d 1023(1964); Sampsell 
v Holt, 115 Ut 73,202 P.2d 550,(1949). The reason 
most often expressed for this rule is that the trial 
court is in an advantaged position to observe the 
witnesses and draw conclusions. As was said in 
Sampsell v. Holt, at 202 P.2d 554: 
"We are not disposed to upset the finding. 
The trial court had the opportunity, as 
we do not, of seeing the parties and the 
witnesses, of observing their demeanor, 
and of forming opinions." 
Therefore, unless it can be shown that the 
mother is unfit, it is proper to leave the children 
in her custody. 
A. The plaintiff has not been shown to be unfit as a 
mother. 
The evidence clearly shows and the Court has found the 
Defendant to be a fit mother (Tr. 51, 71, 344, Ex.6-P). 
The weight of the evidence abundantly shows Defendant is 
not only a fit mother, she apparently is an extra-ordinary 
mother. She is bright, intelligent, industrious, congenial and 
considerate (Tr. 148, 149, 159, 160). For 3-1/2 years of 
Andrew's life, she has more than adequately, fed, clothed, trained 
educated and nurtured him into a stable, well-adjusted child 
(Tr. 63, 71, 79, 115, 120, 160-163, 184-187, 187-194, 195-197). 
The two psychiatrists, Dr. Cantrell Nielson and Dr. Richard Ferre, 
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who evaluated her, have found she has adequately met the needs ^  
of Andrew (Tr. 52, 59, €0, 62rr63, 334, 336, Ex. 6-P) . -
Sexual indiscretion bears on the fitness of a parent only 
when the child is affected or damaged thereby. Further, a good 
mother may exercise poor judgment as a wife. In Sparks v. Sparks, 
29 Ut 2d 263, 508 P. 2d 531 (1973), while having custody of 
minor children from a former marriage, the mother cohabited 
with a man, not her husband. The court held that where a 
mother's indiscretions have not been found to affect or damage 
the child that the mother is not unfit, even though she is 
living with a man. See also, Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Ut 2d 105, 
388 P. 2d 230 (1964), Stuber v Stuber, 121 Ut 632, 244 P. 2d 
650 (1952), Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Ut 371 (1926) where adultery 
was actually proven. 
On balance, the evidence shows both parents to have been 
sexually indiscreet (Tr. 22-27, 31, 39-41, 46, 230-232, 259, 
306, 308-310, 315 346) . Consequently, thre Defendant should no 
more than the Plaintiff be penalized for such conduct, particu-
larly since Andrew was unaware of and unaffected by the 
indiscretions. .,-..-•,,, 
In weighing other conduct of the parties, the Plaintiff 
appears to have disregarded the proper marital decorum befitt-
ing a parent. With consistent regularity he drank excessively, 
stayed out late, lied and caused considerable grief for the 
Defendant (Tr. 12, 117, 125, 133, 167, 170, 174, 223-240, 259, 
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268, 269, 310, 315, 316). In addition, detrimental conduct 
affecting Andrew included use of foul and abusive language in 
the presence of Andrew, and state of intoxication in the 
presence of Andrew (Tr. 175, 232, 233, 236, 251). On provocation, 
Defendant retaliated in kind by her language, and behavior (Tr. 13, 
14, 22, 178, 179, 268, 270, 294-301), but not in the presence 
of Andrew (Tr. 22-38, 118-119). 
There is some question about the stability of the Defendant. 
The two suicide guestures on the part of Defendant were 
considered by the two psychiatrists who clinically evaluated 
her and determined it did not affect her ability to care for 
Andrew (Tr. 52, 59-63, 334-366, Ex 6-P). Likewise, the 
stability of the Plaintiff must also be questioned. As Dr. 
Tedrow testified, there is concern about the emotional stability 
of a person who drinks excessively, lies, uses foul and 
abusive language in the presence of his child (Tr. 97, 98), 
this in addition to his other bizzare conduct. This aspect 
is particularly important because there was no testimony by 
Plaintiff he has reduced or quit his drinking or modified, in 
any way, his other behavior nor is he seeking any professional 
help for his problems. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has 
continued seeing Dr. Robert Mohr for professional advice and 
assistance (Tr. 20-21). 
The paternal grandparents availability bears no significance 
in cases where both parents are fit. As Dr. Cantrell Nielson 
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stated, "grandparents should be grandparents and not sub-
stitute parents, period-" (Tr. 84). At 35 years of age (Tr. 129), 
it is presumed Plaintiff is capable of being a parent. 
As pointed out in the Cox Brief, supra, page 15, unfit-
ness depriving a parent of custody must be a positive and not 
a contemplative or comparative matter. As pointed out above, 
the two psychiatrists who had the opportunity to give a 
clinical evaluation of both parents were clear and precise in 
their recommendation to the court. The third psychiatrist, 
Dr. Jack Tedrow, interviewing the Plaintiff and based on 
inadequate information, suggested a comparative evaluation 
without seeing the Plaintiff or Andrew (Tr. 93-95, 100). There 
appeared to be relative agreement by even Dr. Tedrow there is 
such a thing as a psychological parent (Tr. Ill). In this case, 
the psychological parent was and is the Defendant. 
Based on Wisconsin cases, it was stated in the article 
"Custody - To Which Parent?", Podell, Ralph J; Peck, Harry F.; 
and First, Curry; Marq. L. Rev, 56:51 Winter T73: 
In conclusion it seems clear that the trend 
particularly among the more enlightened courts is 
to ignore the rigid absolutes and legalisms of 
the past and adhere with increasing frequency to 
the trend toward reliance on the social scientists 
and expert testimony of psychologists, psychiatrists, 
social investigators and other experts in the field 
of human behavior. 
It has further been stated that the psychiatric experts 
have knowledge which can be helpful and beyond the reach of the 
attorney, thus, law and psychiatry should work jointly. "Family 
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Law and Psychoanalysis - Some Observations on Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration/1 Katz, Jay, M.D., Fam. L. Q. 1:69 Je. '67. In 
the landmark case of Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 
N.W. 2d 152 (1966), the Court relied heavily on the testimony 
of a psychiatrist and child psychologist to place the child in 
a case where neither party was declared to be unfit. 
The failure of the court below to rely on the recommendations 
of the psychiatrists and take into consideration the testimony 
of the witnesses was an abuse of discretion of great magnitude. 
B. Preference for the mother during tender years 
doctrine prevails in Utah. 
The traditional policy of Utah law, despite statutory 
language, all things being comparatively equal, is a child of 
tender years should be placed in the custody of the mother. 
Cox v Cox, Ut. 2d 532 P.2d 994 (1975), Hyde v Hyde, 22 Ut.2d 
429, 454 P.2d 884, McBroom v McBroom, 14 Ut. 2d 392, 384 P. 2d 
961 (1963), Steiger v Steiger, 4 Ut.2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 (1956), 
Hulse v Hulse 111 Ut. 193, 176 P. 2d 875 (1947), and Holm v. 
Holm, 44 Ut. 242, 139 P. 937 (1914). 
Reflecting judicial wisdom and experience, the court in 
Cox v Cox, supra, stated that in considering the long-term 
welfare and adjustment of children: 
...we think there is wisdom in the traditional 
pattern of thought that the roles of the mother 
and father in the family are such that, all 
other things being comparatively equal, the 
children should be in the care of their mother, 
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especially so children of younger years; and 
this may be true even when the divorce is 
granted to the father. 
In the instant case, both parties were granted the divorce. 
Further support for the above proposition is found in other 
jurisdictions: Wilson v Wilson, 199 Or. 263, 260 P.2d 952 
(1955), State ex rel Hale v. Long, 36 Wash. 2d 432, 218 P. 
2d 884 (1950), Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, 290 P2d 128 (Okla) 
(1955) , Grimditch v Grimditch, 71 Az. 198, 225 P. 2d 489, (1950), 
Hayes v Hayes 134 Colo. 315, 303 P.2d 238 (1956), Bierce v. 
Hansen, 171 Kan. 422, 233 P. 2d 520 (1951), Trudgen v 
Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P. 2d 225 (1958), Stuart v 
Stuart, Cal. Rptr. (1973), Cooke v Cooke M.D. APPL , 319 
A.2d 841 (1974) Erickson v Erickson, Minn. 220 N.W. 
2d 487 (1974). 
Although evidence of a father's role in the development 
of a child is generally inconsistent and meager, the same 
cannot be said of maternal deprivation. It has been said: 
"Despite these methodological problems and 
weaknesses caused by difficulties of 
execution, the sheer weight of confirmatory and 
corroborative evidence regarding adverse 
effects of maternal deprivation reveals the 
undeniable importance of the role of the mother 
in the development of her offspring." "The 
Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric 
Studies to the Future Development of the Laws 
Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental 
Child Custody Dispute," Adrian Bradbrook, J. 
Fam. L. 11:557, '72. 
The article further states that the "boldest justifiable 
conclusion: is that a child of less than 7 years should be 
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placed in the custody of the mother. There is some evidence 
that a male child should be transferred to the father at age 
7, but, in view of undesirable results of changing custody, 
the better choice would be to have all children remain with 
their mother throughout childhood. 
In the instant case, Andrew is of the tender age of 
3-1/2 (Tr. 11). The testimony shows his closeness to his 
mother (Tr. 48-84, 115, 120, 160-163, 184-187, 187-194, 195-
197, Ex 6-P). The testimony further shows he is in the 
nuturing stage where the mother's influence is indispensable 
(Tr. 48-84, Ex 6-P). Thus, according to the traditional policy 
of the Courts of this state, preference should be given to the 
mother, she being a fit and proper person to raise Andrew. 
C. In awarding custody of minor children, the best 
interests of the child is the cardinal principle. 
The universally accepted principle regarding custody of 
minor children is that the best interest of the child is the 
controlling factor in every case. Walton v Coffman, 110 
Ut 1, 169 P. 2d 97 (1946). 
From the evidence presented, there is no substantial in-
dication that Plaintiff can better serve Andrew's needs than 
can the Defendant. Andrew is not in need of any specialized 
care. The only difference may be economic. Plaintiff's 
potential and capacity to earn more money than Defendant is 
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not disputed (Tr. 201-208, 264-265, Ex 5-D) . In making a custody 
determination, however, financial status is to be considered, 
but it is not determinative of the quality of care a child will 
receive and, thus, should not be the basis for a decision. 
White v. White, 29 Ut 2 148, 506 P. 2d 69 (1973). 
The quality of care Andrew will receive is of concern to 
all. There is nothing to indicate Defendant has not been a 
good mother, there is nothing to indicate Defendant has mis-
treated Andrew physically or otherwise, there is nothing to 
indicate she has not fed, clothed, trained, educated and 
nutured him properly and adequately, there is nothing to indicate 
she has subjected him to any unwholesome or immoral environment, 
and there is nothing to indicate she shall do any of the above 
in the future. She has been a sincere, concerned and loving 
mother at all times. 
The quality of a mother's love cannot be measured by the 
difficulties of the parents. The difficulties of the parents, 
however, should not prevent the Court from measuring the 
quality of the mother's love in this instance. In spite of all 
the emotional strain for both parties, the Defendant has 
strained most for the best interests of the child. Her will-
ingness to voluntarily permit Plaintiff to have possession of 
the child during the pendency of the divorce is only but one 
measure of her willingness to put the child's interest first 
and not make him the proverbial football (Tr. 257). She should 
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not be penalized for this. 
Perhaps, Dr. Ferre's comments can capsulize why, in the 
long term interest of Andrew, he should be awarded to Defendant; 
Looking, however, toward his long term needs, 
he clearly is attached to his mother. She seems 
capable of continuing to provide the maternal care 
but (sic) he needs. If she remarries, there is no 
indication that this would adversely effect her 
ability to adequately care for Andrew. 
Mr. Mecham's hostility and vindictiveness in 
this case is of real concern. I would anticipate 
this will cause continued conflict. If Andrew 
were left in his custody, I would be concerned how 
Mr. Mecham's emotional problems, in this area, would 
effect Andrew's future development. 
Clearly a decision in this case is difficult, 
but from my examination there is presently no major 
reason why Mrs. Mechara should be deprived of 
custody of Andrew....(EX 6-P). 
The Lower Court had concern for Defendant's emotional 
stability. Obviously, the psychiatrists were more concerned, 
with Plaintiff's emotional stability. 
The introduction of the paternal grandparents into the 
disposition of custody was, indeed, unfortunate. Neither 
grandparent was in Court to testify nor was any direct evidence 
relating to their fitness given except for a comment by Dr. 
Ferre who detected problems (EX 6-P). Otherwise, there is no 
evidence of the age, ability, environment, relationship and 
rapport concerning the grandparents. The most disturbing 
aspect of the Court's rationale was its conclusion that the 
grandparents were willing to assume the major responsibility for 
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the child (there is no evidence of this in the record) and that the child 
was with the the grandparents (there is no evidence of this in the record). 
Where there are two f i t parents (Tr. 51, 71, 344), how the Court makes 
the leap frcm the Plaintiff, about whom the evidence is sparse regarding 
his performance to care for the ch i ld , to the grandparents, for 
whom there i s even l e s s evidence, i s d i f f i c u l t to comprehend. 
Furthermore, the Cour t ' s statement, "I don ' t want to twis t 
the chi ld up, t h a t ' s my endeavor and prob lem. . . . " i s generous, 
but confusing (Tr. 342). And, the Cour t ' s statement about the 
s p l i t custody of the chi ld (Tr. 341) as i t was before, remains 
a mystery, p a r t i c u l a r l y a three way s p l i t between the grand-
parents , the P l a i n t i f f and Defendant. The p s y c h i a t r i s t s have 
also s ta ted tha t s t a b i l i t y i s important. How, placing the 
chi ld with the major r e spons ib i l i t y in the grandparents provides 
s t a b i l i t y i s an enigma. The chi ld w i l l now be placed in a 
four way rout ine between the grandparents, the fa ther , the 
nursery school or b a b y - s i t t e r , and the mother (Tr. 88, 144, 
145, 146, 329, 334, 336). This ce r t a in ly i s not s t a b i l i t y nor 
in the best i n t e r e s t of the ch i ld . 
If the chi ld were awarded to the Defendant, Andrew would 
have the most comparable s t a b i l i t y he experienced pr io r to the 
divorce, the whole a t t en t ion of the mother (Tr. 338, 339) and 
the l i b e r a l v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s of the fa ther . 
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SUMMARY 
Based on the record, the evidence shows the lower Court 
abused its discretion and erred in its ruling granting the 
care, custody and control of the minor child to the Plaintiff. 
The Lower Court has found and the evidence clearly proves 
the mother is a fit and stable mother. During the period 
Defendant had Andrew, he was stable and relatively free from 
symptoms emanating from vibrations of a divorce. Defendant 
was a good, loving and concerned mother to Andrew. 
The policy of the law in this state is to award custody 
of children of tender years to the mother, all things being 
comparatively equal. The evidence shows the parties are at 
least equal and, in Plaintiff's best light, he has problems 
with which he must cope. 
The best interest of the child should be the primary 
consideration of this Court. Based on the evidence elicited, 
the facts adduced, and the policy of the law, it is in the 
best interest of the child, now, and for the future, to award 
custody of the child to the Defendant. 
Thus, the Defendant respectfully requests that the decision 
of the Lower Court be reversed, and that custody of the minor 
child be awarded to Defendant subject to liberal visitation 
rights to the Plaintiff and further remand this case for deter-
mination of a proper and adequate amount to be paid by Plaintiff 
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